A WEEKLY PREMIUM NEWSLETTER ON CHINA'S TECH
- Insights: Europe's 5G challenge and why there is no easy way out
- The week
- Featured: E-sports gambling escapes scrutiny, for now
- China voices: Ofo’s Final Fight
- Smart reads
In this week’s newsletter, Jan-Peter Kleinhans, project director of Security in the Internet of Things, offers his perspective on 5G adoption, reliance, and security in Europe as it relates to dependency on Chinese technology.
The booming e-sports industry is giving a boost to side-businesses like sports gambling. Tony Xu goes deep in the Chinese web to explore this emerging trend on the margins of legality.
TechNode contributor Jordan Schneider tells the story of the shocking rise and fall of a Chinese unicorn: the bike-sharing startup Ofo.
Enjoy these readings and have a nice weekend,
Europe's 5G challenge and why there is no easy way out
June 22, 2019
The current debate about whether Chinese mobile network equipment vendors pose a threat to European security is messy, and heavily driven by a US perspective and agenda. Compared to the United States, however, the situation here in the European Union is much more complicated.
Some facts to keep in mind: Huawei has been in Europe for almost 20 years, employs more than 12,000 people, and has research collaborations with roughly 150 universities. Since 2016, Huawei has consistently been one of top three patent applicants at the European Patent Office. Almost every EU member state has at least one mobile network operator deploying Huawei (and/or ZTE) equipment—especially in Radio Access Network (RAN). As an example, roughly 50% of Germany's 75,000 base stations come from Chinese vendors. But many policymakers in Brussels and in member states think that Huawei became the world market leader for mobile network equipment through industrial espionage and price dumping. In fact, the company's R&D budget is significantly and consistently higher than that of direct competitors Ericsson and Nokia. Huawei leads in 5G by almost every metric—the number of 5G Standard Essential Patents (SEP) filed, the number of employees sent to 3GPP standards meetings, the number of contributions to the 5G standards.
The case of Huawei and 5G is part of a broader development in information and communications technology (ICT). We are moving away from a unipolar world with the US as the technology leader, to a bipolar world in which China plays an increasingly dominant role in ICT development. Europe is accustomed to technological dependency on the US—but how do we feel about increasing dependency on China?
Why it matters where technology comes from
The digitalization of our society and industry is built on highly complex, constantly changing, interconnected, and interdependent ICT systems that are ultimately untrustworthy. They are untrustworthy because, as I argued in a paper earlier this year, IT security certification, code reviews, and audits do not scale and are not up to the task of identifying malicious code among millions of lines of code running on billions of transistors. Committed state actors with limitless budgets and time will always find a way to infiltrate and compromise foreign ICT systems. Thus, one has to rely on manufacturers to keep their systems secure through software updates—and not to abuse their privileged access. The extent to which one trusts the manufacturer depends on the legal and regulatory environment out of which it operates. The Snowden revelations show why rule of law matters for trust: The documents showed that the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted parcels containing network equipment. The NSA would open the parcel, install custom malware on specific network equipment, repackage it, and send the parcel on its way to the customer. All of that happened unbeknownst to the manufacturer. Even though Cisco holds more than 50% of the global network switch market, there was never a debate in Europe about ripping out US network equipment. Why? Partly, because Europe was confident in US rule of law and the country’s legal system. Rightly so. Of course, US intelligence agencies and law enforcement have extensive and overbearing powers. But its companies fight in court against government attempts to break into devices or access to sensitive customer data. How realistic is it that Huawei would fight in front of a Chinese court against handing over customer data to the Chinese police?
What are we worried about?
The debate about Huawei and 5G often conflates two very different issues—the challenge of building and maintaining trustworthy and resilient communication networks, and the question of technological dependency. The current focus in the US is dependency on Chinese technology, as the US Department of Defense wrote in a key report. But we need to distinguish between the two issues, as they call for very different policy responses. If we replaced all Chinese equipment in our mobile networks, it would not magically make us secure—but it would make us less dependent on China.
Two security scenarios are most often discussed: industrial espionage and network sabotage.
Industrial espionage of Chinese origin is a massive problem for European and other businesses, and we need better and stronger tools to fight it. But so far mobile networks have not played a role in espionage campaigns. State-sponsored hackers often infiltrate computer networks through spear-phishing mails, clever social engineering, and exploits for desktop operating systems or internet network equipment. A well-written, infected e-mail sent to a CEO or IT administrator is still (and will continue to be) a highly efficient attack vector.
Of course, mobile network-based attacks might become more common with 5G. That is exactly why governments are right to be worried about the security of our future digital infrastructures. There is a lot they can do to improve the trustworthiness and resilience of our mobile networks. That said, these measures will never eliminate risk, only reduce it. This fact of life has not stopped us from connecting other critical infrastructure—from nuclear power plants to hospitals to energy grids—to the internet.
In a nutshell, building and maintaining trustworthy digital infrastructures is a shared responsibility between vendors, operators, and national regulatory authorities—and should be addressed on four different levels: standards, implementation, configuration, and processes. 3GPP needs to develop standards that utilize strong end-to-end encryption to shield traffic from network equipment. Vendors are responsible for the secure implementation of those standards in their equipment, and there should be mandatory baseline requirements. Secure configuration of the deployed equipment is then the responsibility of the operator. That is not an easy task and will require a lot of coordination between all actors. Network sabotage, which disrupts the flow of information and renders network resources unavailable, is a different beast entirely. Attackers can prepare a kill-chain well in advance and only use it once it is necessary—the famous "kill-switch." Both because of the complexity of today's mobile network equipment, and because of regular and continuous manufacturer software updates, security audits and certification processes are of limited help here. They certainly reduce the risk but do not eliminate it. Risk mitigation against network sabotage has to address the mobile operator's processes and network planning. The European Commission's 5G Recommendations talk about "cybersecurity through diversity of suppliers," and Germany's (preliminary) 5G security requirements proposed similar requirements. Diversity of network equipment and thorough network planning have a significant impact on the resilience of those mobile networks. The UK National Cyber Security Center already sits down with operators during the network planning phase. Redundancy and shared network infrastructure is another way to improve resilience against network sabotage. National roaming would definitely improve resilience. The UK has arguably the most experience with assessing the trustworthiness of Chinese mobile network equipment. If their ongoing Telecoms Supply Chain Review comes to the conclusion that Chinese vendors should be excluded from certain core network functions, such as lawful interception for law enforcement agencies, Europe would do well to follow suit.
These steps would do a lot to improve the trustworthiness and resilience of our networks, and we aren’t doing them yet. But banning companies does very little to fix the countless flaws present in today's ICT systems.
It would also put us on a costly and unproductive road toward paranoia: If we ban Huawei and ZTE from the 5G rollout, do we need to ban Chinese 5G modules in autonomous cars? What about the AI coprocessors from China in your smartphone? What about solar technology from Huawei in your energy grid?
It's about dependency, stupid
The more challenging discussion and the real driver of the current 5G debate is the fact that Europe and many other Western nations have become increasingly dependent on Chinese technology. China is no longer just the "factory of the world," but instead an economic competitor and at the same time a "systemic rival." For ICT, and especially semiconductors, the country still lags behind and is highly dependent on foreign designs, IP, and chips. This is why US export control measures against Huawei are so effective in disrupting their supply chain. But for how long? The collateral damage is massive, and China has already announced its own "entity list" to halt business with foreign companies. The semiconductor industry is susceptible to these types of geoeconomic strategies, because of the (for now) global nature of the semiconductor supply chain. But where is this leading us? Chinese companies are doubling down on self-reliance to ensure business continuity. Disrupting ICT supply chains through export control measures hurts innovation and might very well lead to decoupling. In this scenario, technology will be developed with two different sets of standards—the US and its allies on the one side and China and its allies on the other. This would pose a huge challenge to companies that need to maintain different supply chains for different markets. Most importantly, it would not result in more trustworthy or resilient ICT systems and digital infrastructure.
Europe is correct not to follow the US call to entirely ban Chinese equipment. The problem is much more complicated than that. Indeed, we are becoming more and more dependent on ICT systems from a country that we perceive as a systemic rival. That's not good. But banning Chinese companies would do a disservice to our own industry: 5G is first and foremost an infrastructure that companies need to adopt in order to develop innovative services and applications for their own industries.
An indiscriminate ban against Chinese 5G vendors would significantly delay the 5G rollout in Europe and give Chinese industries an even greater head start in developing services, applications, and new business models to fully utilize future 5G infrastructure. This could very well mean that in a few years, our industry will have to rely on those more innovative and efficient 5G applications and services to make the most use of our infrastructure – making us even more dependent.
Thus, instead of banning, the answer should be to strengthen our own industry in key technologies and critical sectors. That also means we need to do the hard work of properly assessing risks in a highly connected society and industry. Europe does a great job of articulating responsibilities and defining requirements. But in a highly software-defined world where "code is law," maybe there is no way around getting our hands dirty, spending the money, and creating our own systems again?
– Jan-Peter Kleinhans
Project director, Security in the Internet of Things
+49 (0) 30 81 45 03 78-99
Twitter @JPKleinhans | Wire @JPKleinhans
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Tencent’s “PUBG Mobile” replacement in China, “Game for Peace,” is projected to gross $1 billion by the end of 2019, Gameindustry.biz reported, citing a recent report from game market research firm Niko Partners. According to the report, the game is likely to include monetization strategies similar to those in “PUBG Mobile,” which has generated approximately $400 million in revenue in overseas markets since it launched in February 2018. “Game for Peace” officially replaced its predecessor in China on May 8.
Tencent has appointed the former head of its fintech business, Lai Zhiming, as the new chairman of Infinium, the digital banking joint venture in Hong Kong between Tencent, ICBC, and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing. Meanwhile, Lin Haifeng, previously the investment and management partner at the company, has replaced Lai as the new head of the fintech unit.
Tencent launched its first overseas video streaming service in Thailand on June 14, Reuters reported. The service, WeTV, will feature original Chinese content with Thai dubbing from Tencent’s film production and distribution subsidiary, Tencent Penguin Pictures, as well as content created with local partners in Thailand. According to the senior vice president of the subsidiary, the country’s existing user base for Tencent products makes it a good starting point to push into Southeast Asia.
Alibaba Group has entered into a strategic collaboration with the municipal government of Yiwu to launch an Electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP) hub. Located in east China’s Zhejiang province, Yiwu is widely known as China’s small commodities capital, exporting goods to more than 200 countries and regions. The eWTP hub will enhance access to overseas buyers and digital services and infrastructure for Yiwu’s small sellers.
Didi has formed a two-wheeler business group as it ramps up efforts to compete for China’s 300 million motorists, according to an internal letter released late Monday. The new group combines Didi’s bike-rental business unit with another team running a platform named Jietu for motor scooter rentals.
A bike manufacturer in Tianjin has taken bike-rental company Ofo to court over a RMB 250 million (around $36.2 million) unfulfilled bicycle production bid. However, the court found that Ofo has no assets, including real estate, investments, or vehicles. In addition, the company’s bank accounts have been frozen by other courts. Since Ofo has no way to pay for the bid, enforcement has been suspended. As of Wednesday, Ofo has received more than 170 enforcements from courts around China.
Short-video app Kuaishou plans to optimize its organizational structure and speed up the product refinement process to boost growth, with the goal of reaching 300 million daily active users (DAU) before the next Spring Festival (which falls in late January of 2020), 36Kr reports. As of this May, Kuaishou had reached 200 million DAU, the vice president of the app announced. In an internal letter, co-founders Su Hua and Cheng Yixiao expressed their dissatisfaction with the company’s loose structure and employee sluggishness.
China’s largest telecommunications network operator announced that it had awarded its first round of 5G network equipment contracts—worth around $2 billion—to four suppliers, including Ericsson and Nokia.
American chipmakers Qualcomm and Intel are lobbying the US government to ease a ban on selling components to Huawei, the embattled Chinese smartphone and telecommunications equipment maker. The chipmakers argue that Huawei’s smartphones and computer servers are unlikely to pose the same security concerns as its equipment for 5G networks. One person familiar with the issue quoted by Reuters said that the lobbying was not about helping Huawei but rather to prevent harm to American companies.
Ren Zhengfei, founder and CEO of Huawei, said on Monday that he expected the US trade blacklist would reduce production output by $30 billion over the next two years.
On Tuesday, the Shanghai government released guidelines revealing its plans to bolster the city’s competitive gaming industry, with the aim to be a global “e-sports capital” in three to five years. This is not the first time that Shanghai has expressed its ambitions in this area. A document released by the municipal government in December 2017 to facilitate the development of the city’s cultural and creative industries included a loose framework for e-sports industry development.
Meituan’s billionaire co-founder and CEO Wang Xing is planning to invest $300 million in Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer Chehejia, also known as CHJ. The company is known for its smart electric car brand Leading Ideal. Wang will lead Chehejia’s more-than-$500 million round, which values the company at nearly $2.9 billion. CHJ founder Li Xiang will contribute around $100 million; existing investors including Matrix Partners, Shougang Fund, and Bluerun Ventures will also participate in the round. A Meituan spokesman declined to comment when contacted by TechNode on Monday.
Two Chinese autonomous vehicle (AV) startups, AutoX and Pony.ai, are joining an exclusive group of companies approved to offer self-driving rides to the public in California after receiving approval from the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) on Tuesday.
|Featured: E-sports gambling escapes scrutiny, for now|
E-sports is big in China, and it is quickly growing bigger. The size of the e-sports market, which was RMB 8.48 billion (around $1.23 billion) in 2018, could more than double by 2020 to RMB 21.10 billion, according to a report from China Central Television (CCTV), the country’s state television broadcaster.
According to the report, the industry will create massive demand for e-sports professionals in China— half a million by 2020. A recent report provided to TechNode by PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that the e-sports industry will rake in more than $212 million in revenue in 2019.
In addition to creating jobs and revenue, the booming e-sports industry has also opened up new opportunities for betting and gambling in the form of tournaments. Sports betting is heavily regulated in China—and depending on the nature of the reward given to participants, can run afoul of regulators. Yet despite the general crackdown on such activities, some e-sports betting platforms are easily accessible in China.
These bookmakers usually appear in the form of e-sports news or live-streaming websites. By naming the services they provide as “prediction” or “guessing contests,” these websites have even acquired internet cultural operation licenses from China’s Ministry of Culture. However, legal experts believe that while the operations of certain websites are still within the bounds of law, others are downright illegal.
How it works
One of the most well-known Chinese websites providing “guessing contest” services is the live-streaming platform Huomao, which was launched in 2014. In contrast to large live-streaming platforms, Huomao offers a limited number of content categories, with a very heavy focus on e-sports games such as “Dota 2,” “CS: GO,” and “League of Legends.” Out of the 16 categories, only six are for individual games, with four of them being e-sports games. In comparison, New York-listed live-streaming platform Huya hosts 434 categories as of June 18.
Huomao allows users to gamble using tokens purchased with cash. Upon registration, users are given the option to purchase tokens named “cat beans,” at an exchange rate of 1,000 “cat beans” per RMB 1. Transactions can only be made with Alipay and WeChat Pay, with the upper limits reaching as high as RMB 99,999 per top-up if the users choose Alipay.
Users can then place “cat bean” stakes on the results of tournaments for four e-sports titles: “Dota 2,” “CS: GO,” “League of Legends,” and “Honour of Kings.” On June 18, there were 15 e-sports matches for users to bet on. The type of bets are similar to those in regular sports betting: the result of a match; the result of a match with an “Asian handicap,” in which the supposed stronger team starts the game with negative 1.5 points whereas its opponent starts with 1.5 points; and the total points scored in a match—whether the total exceeds 2.5 in a “best of three” match.
Rewards on Huomao also come in the form of “cat beans,” which can be redeemed (at the 1,000 “cat beans” per RMB 1 rate) for gift cards worth RMB 100 or RMB 500 on Tmall, JD.com, Apple Store, NetEase Yanxuan, as well as membership cards for video streaming services iQiyi and Youku. Also up for exchange are physical gifts such as iPads—priced at 3.3 million “cat beans.”
Similar betting opportunities can be found on a number of other websites. VPGame and xxdianjing, for instance, disguise tokens as free gifts that accompany the purchase of otherwise useless virtual items. These “free” tokens can then be used for betting, with VPGame requiring users to exchange the tokens that come with the initial purchase—named “V coin”—into a second kind of “P coin” before being able to place any bets. The tokens won from bets can be used to exchange gift cards of varying values and physical rewards (xxdianjing), or virtual items in games (VPGame).
An even more prevalent kind of e-sports betting uses a special type of tokens: high-value cosmetic items—“skins” that change the appearance of weapons or game avatars—in “Dota 2” and “CS: GO.” A “Dota 2” item named “dragonclaw hook,” for instance, can fetch more than $450 on skins.cash, a website where users can sell these items for cash.
While Huomao does allow users to use skins as betting tokens, VPGame is generally recognized as the largest platform for cosmetic item betting. To participate, users either purchase skins directly on the website with normal tokens or deposit cosmetic items from their accounts on Steam—the world’s largest digital game distribution platform, where users can win these items via gameplay and trade them with other players for Steam credits.
Cosmetic items are assigned values depending on rarity by the website upon purchase or deposit, and then treated like regular tokens. Upon winning an item bet, VPGame will reward winners with vouchers that can either be sold for regular tokens or used as stakes in future bets. Users who wish to keep the cosmetic items or sell them elsewhere are given the option to transfer them back to their Steam accounts.
Chinese regulators make a very clear distinction between “guessing contests” and gambling. “Guessing contests” are legal and are sometimes referred to as “match predictions” to appear even more benign. However, participation in gambling and providing related services (either offline and online) are criminal offenses punishable by up to three years in prison.
According to He Jing, a lawyer with Merits & Tree Law Offices in Beijing, if a betting platform wishes to be categorized as a provider of “guessing contests,” it must not cross either of the two red lines set by regulators: taking commissions from users, and allowing exchanges between cash or goods and tokens. Platforms that take cash as stakes are always considered illegal in China, with the exception of sports lotteries that are licensed by the General Administration of Sport.
These two red lines put some e-sports betting websites in a very precarious position. While Huomao does not take commissions for bets and therefore does not cross the first red line, it has crossed the second one by selling tokens and allowing users to redeem tokens for gift cards and physical items, He told TechNode.
Even when tokens are disguised as free gifts from purchases of virtual items, which is the case for xxdianjing and VPGame, the nature of using cash to acquire tokens hasn’t changed. Under this condition, if websites still give users the option to redeem tokens for cash or goods, they will be considered as gambling platforms, He added.
However, websites like VPGame, which specialize in cosmetic item betting, are still currently legal, He told TechNode. This is because goods in gambling laws are commonly interpreted as physical goods, and while a number of courts have ruled that virtual game items have some property-like qualities, the cases are not gambling-related. At least for now, rewarding users with virtual game items for winning bets is considered tolerable to regulators, though the interpretation is subject to change, He said.
According to He, although some of these items can fetch high prices on third-party trading platforms, the fact that such transactions are performed by players without the help of betting platforms essentially exempt websites such as VPGame from punishment.
What’s the harm?
In addition to being illegal, e-sports gambling also poses the threat of unfair competition or even match-fixing. In April 2018, two teams in the first division of Dota 2 Professional League (DPL), a large-scale Chinese e-sports tournament, were permanently removed from the league for match-fixing, with five players banned from competing in the league for two years. Just a few days afterward, two other teams in the DPL’s secondary league were also found guilty of match-fixing and subsequently banned.
Between the lines
The unfair competition brought about by e-sports gambling could severely impact the quality of matches and thereby the profitability of the industry, said Liu Jiehao, an analyst from research group iiMedia—adding that e-sports betting platforms could magnify the pernicious effect.
E-sports betting platforms depend on the healthy development of the e-sports industry, and doing too much harm to it is counterproductive.
– Tony Xu
|China voices: Ofo’s Final Fight|
Ofo flew too close to the sun. Their dockless bike-share model blew my mind when I first moved to China (I snuck a ridiculous quote into the China Times), and for a time Ofo was perhaps the hottest startup in the world. But by 2019, half the Ofo bikes I try to unlock in Beijing are broken, thousands have lined up outside Ofo HQ to demand refunds on their $30 deposits, and their CEO is now on a blacklist and barred from leaving the country.
Why was the rise so precipitous? A sexy model and investor FOMO. The business model of scattering bikes around cities and allowing users to unlock them with their phones for an upfront deposit plus 25 cents per ride was incredibly attractive. Financial analyses of the firm “raised the fighting spirits of investors” who worried that if they weren’t able to wriggle their way into Ofo’s cap table, “everyone would know that they weren’t top-tier funds.”
The enormous funding rounds (at its height, Ofo raised an Alibaba-backed $866 million round on a $3 billion valuation) combined with a fierce battle for market share with competitor Mobike led, unsurprisingly, to reckless spending. “’Just think about winning the war—don’t worry about money’ was the key internal slogan echoing in employees’ ears. Describing that time, one employee said, ‘It’s like when a poor person wins a million dollars in a lottery, but the requirement is that you need to spend half of it to keep the other half. You don’t know how to spend the cash, so you just blow it.”
So the firm spent tens of millions on Facebook ads alone to spark overseas growth, splurged on heated toilets and “Google-level” food to attract top talent, and spent extra for rush orders on bikes.
What was the turning point? According to this article, as well as a Pony Ma WeChat Moments post, it came down to veto rights.
“Experienced entrepreneurs know: Under normal circumstances, do not accept investments from two (or more) of Tencent, Alibaba or Baidu at the same time. But Ofo CEO Dai Wei allowed the Tencent Department's Didi and Alibaba's Ant Financial Service to sit on Ofo’s board of directors. Today, behind every business story, there’s also a capital investment story. It is dangerous to violate common sense.”
Balancing investments from internet giants is a dangerous game in the Chinese startup landscape. While Didi CEO Cheng Wei was able to keep both Tencent and Alibaba somewhat happy, Wang Xing's accepting Tencent money provoked Alibaba to pour billions into Meituan direct competitor Ele.me. In this case, Ofo’s decision to open a WeChat mini-app (which does not accept Alipay) convinced Alibaba that Ofo could no longer be trusted. Ali convinced an early shareholder to transfer his board veto to them, thus enabling them to block potential buyout offers by Didi. Said one investor, “As soon as Ali joined the board, Ofo had no more moves to make.”
Xu Xiaoping, the founder of Zhenfund, said, “Dai had been president of the Peking University Student Union [i.e., a stepping stone to political success]. Secondly, he went to Guizhou to teach after graduation. This means he’s an idealist. If I don’t invest in this sort of founder, who do I invest in?”
These ideals also led the CEO to fight it out to the last breath. Dai told employees who pushed him to take a buyout that “experience is worth more than money.”
So he went to war. In May 2018, he called a company meeting to release a plan called “Victory Day.”
“In front of a hundred colleagues, he recalled the movie The Darkest Hour, comparing Ofo to England wavering at the start of World War II. He used Churchill’s example to exhort Ofo to never give up, to defend its freedom, and to fight until the last yuan.”
After taking this stand, there were some small victories. Ofo started selling full-screen video ads that users would have to endure before unlocking their bikes, bringing in over 15 million dollars.
But the writing was on the wall. With Alibaba vetoing any further cash investment, and Didi having decided to build its own bike-share empire by buying out competitor Bluegogo, Ofo wasn’t able to keep up its service. In Beijing, half the Ofo bikes I tried to unlock were broken. At some point, customers lost faith that their deposits would be refunded, and a “bank run” of sorts began. Right now, there’s a line of over 10 million users waiting to get their RMB 200 back.
Bicycle graveyards began to proliferate across China. One photographer was most struck by the bikes “weeping.” It took him a moment to realize that this was the sound of the electronic lock failing. “If you only hear this sound once or twice, it sounds like a cicada. But when its one after another, it hits your ears like a tidal wave. These bikes have been treated so roughly, they’re trying to tell us their story with this scream.”
– Jordan Schneider, TechNode contributor
Learning sense. As AI systems take hold of our lives, sensors will play a major role. (VitalEdge) Open for AI. Bruce Schneier and James Waldo make the case that AI can thrive in open societies. (ForeignPolicy) To UBI or not to UBI. Proposals for Universal Basic Income as a solution to globalization and automation may indicate a breakdown in democratic politics and civic life. (ProjectSyndicate) Extreme thinking. Trolls may permeate online forums and platforms, but extreme radicalization may still be taking place offline. (New York Times)
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